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1. Introduction 
In recent years, Robert Barro's [1974] version of "Ricardian 
equivalence" has stimulated much controversy concerning the effects of 
government budget deficits and social security programs. In his well— 
known paper, Barro supplented the traditional overlapping generations 
model with intergenerational altruism, and argued, in essence, that 
voluntary transfers between parents and children cause the represen- 
tative family to behave as though it is a single, infinite—lived 
individual——a 
"dynastic" unit. From the point of view of the family, 
neither debt nor social security alters available alternatives; both are 
therefore neutral. Thus, Barro's analysis identifies the strength of 
intergenerational altruism as a key factor in determining tne effects of 
government bond issues and public pension programs. 
Recently, Bernheim and Bagwell [1988] have argued against the 
applicability of Ricardian equivalence by demonstrating that Barro's 
assumptions guarantee the irrelevance of all redistributional policies, 
distortionary taxes, and prices——the neutrality of fiscal policy is only 
the 
"tip of the iceburg." Their results rely on the existence of 
intrafamily linkages, which arise whenever two unrelated individuals 
produce a common child, Bernheim and Eagwell concluded that, since 
these other propositions do not hold even approxirrately, one cannot 
assert that the world is approximately dynastic. Accordingly, all 
conclusions following from the dynastic framework (including Ricardian 
equivalence) are suspect. 
Bernheim and Bagwell also noted that it might be possible to 
reinstate approximate Ricardian equivalence without generating untenable 
consequences by introducing a small amount of friction'. Intuitively, 
friction would cumulate with each link and would become substantial for 
long chains. Since Ricardian equivalence (for debt redeemed within a 
few generations) presumably depends on short chains while the Bernheim— 
Bagwell results presurrably depand on long ones (we note that these 
presumptions may be erroneous——see section 7), the introduction of 
friction mit just do the trick, 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the preceding argument by 
formally introduciing various forms of friction into a model with 
altruistically motivated intergenerational transfers. We focus on 
frictions arising from three sources: the derivation of pleasure 
directly from the act of giving; incomplete information about others' 
preferences; and egalitarian social norms that constrain parents to 
divide transfers evenly between children. The first two sources of 
friction turn out to be quite similar analytically, and give rise to 
qualitatively similar results, In particular, one can obtain 
approxite Ricardian equivalence by introducing a sufficiently small 
amount of friction. Furthermore, for any given amount of friction, one 
can reinstate the relevance of other redistributional policies by taking 
the population to be sufficiently large (it follows from this that taxes 
will distort behavior, and prices will play an important allocational 
role). However, there is a hitch: by simultaneously taking friction to 
be snll and population to be large, one drives each individual's 
marginal propensity to consume out of wealth to zero. In resolving 
—3-. 
several paradoxes posed by Bernheim and gwell, one therefore merely 
encoiters another. 
The introduction of elitarian constraints generates some 
intruiging results. Most importantly, one obtains exact Ricardian 
equivalence in a world where other redistributional policies have 
significant allocative effects. Since there is no need to assume that 
this source of friction is "small," one does not encounter the own— 
wealth effect puzzle noted above. We are troubled however by the 
rather ad hoc nature of this constraint. In addition, its imposition 
generates a new paradox: we show that an exogenous increase in the 
wealth of any given individual is never Pareto improving. Consequently, 
we conclude that the theoretical case for Ricardian equivalence remeins 
tenuous even when one explicitly recognizes sources of economic 
friction. 
We ornize our discussion as follows. Section 2 lays out the 
basic model, cescribes an appropriate notion of equilibrium, and 
presents some technical results which facilitate the analysis of 
subsequent sections. In sections 3 through 6 we consider, respectively, 
specialized cases in which a) there is no friction, b) altruists derive 
utility in part directly from the act of giving, c) agents have 
incomplete information about each others' preferences, and d) parents 
are constrained to divide transfers equally between their children. 
Section 7 contains some concluding remarks. We defer all technical 
manipulations and proofs to the appendices. Appendix A contains a 
complete treatment of comparative statics for cases b and c above, while 
—4— 
Appendix B treats case d. We present proofs of specific results in 
Appendix C. 
2. The Model 
We ccnsider an economy comprised of 2N households. Despite the 
fact that we treat each household as if it consists of a single 
individual, one should for the purpose of interpretation think of 
households as nErried couples. The population is evenly divided between 
two groups of households, henceforth referred to as "parents" and 
children," Thus, there are N parents (labelled p., i = 1,...,N), 
and N children (labelled k., i = 1,... ,N), Eve parent has two 
children, and every child has two parents (reflecting the fact that 
spouses originally come from different households). We assume in 
particular that p's children are k and k1 (where, by 
convention, kNl = kj. It is therefore appropriate to think of 
intrafamily relations as a kind of circle (pictured in figure 1), 
consisting of an outer layer (parents) and an inner layer (children). 
This representation of intrafamily relations is unquestionably 
highly stylized, and does not reflect the full complexity of family 
networks, particularly in cases where these networks span more than two 
generations (see Bernheim and Bagwell [1986]). On the other hand, this 
framework has the advantage of rendering our current analytic objectives 
tractable, while in all likelihood doing very little violence to the 
underlying economic issues. We return to this point in section 7, and 
argue that more realistic modelling of family networks would only tend 
to strengthen our conclusions. 
—5— 
Parent is endowed with wealth, W similarly, child is 
endowed with w. Parent P. divides his wealth between consumption 
(Ci, a transfer to child k (T), and a transfer to child k (tj, 1 1 1 1+1 1 
C. = — T. — t. 1 1 1 1 
subject, of course, to non—netivity constraints (C. > 0, T. > 0, 
t. > 0). Child i receives transfers from parents p and p1 
(where, by convention, p p1), and consumes all available resources 
C. = w. + T. + t. 1 1 1 i1 
We suppose that children are completely selfish, so that the well- 
being of child k. is given by 
u. = u(c.) 
With probability It, parent is also completely selfish, so that his 
well being is given by 
= u(Ci 
(note that the felicity function for parents is identical to that for 
children——this restriction is inessential). With probability 
(1 — it), parent p. is altruistic; this entails non—paternalistic 
altruism for his child (as in Frro [1974]), and possibly some concern 
for the magnitude of his bequests (as in Andreoni [1986]): 
= u(C.) + [u(c,) + u(c.1)} + m[v(T.) + v(tj] 
—6— 
(a, > 0). For simplicity, we assume that the random events that 
determine parental preferences are distributed independently over 
parents. Throughout, we also assuma that u() and v() are twice 
continuously differentiable and strictly concave. 
The final allocation of resources is determined through a 
simultaneous move game, in which each parent chooses his own 
consumption, as well as intergenerational transfers. Each parent's 
preferences are private information; while parent p. knows whether or 
not he himself is altruistic, his fnformation concerning others is 
limited to owledge of the distribution of preferences described 
above. It is therefore necessary to employ a solution concept that 
allows for incomplete information. The natural choice is to focus 
attention on Eayesian Nash Eauilibria (see Harsanyi [1967—68]). 
In a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (hencefort BNE), we assign to each 
parent a function mapping his preferences into decisions. These 
decisions m.st maximize his expected utility given associated 
preferences, and given the distribution of other parents' decisions 
induced by their assigned fLmctions. In the current context, a BNE has 
a particularly simple form. When parent i is selfish, he will 
obviously set T1, t. = 0, rerdless of what other rents do. Thus, 
we need only describe the choices, (Tt1) which are contingent upon 
* *N 
parent I being altruistic. Accordingly, (T.,t.)i1 is a BNE if for 
all i, (T,t) solves 
—7— 
(3) max u(W. - T. - t,) + (1 - .)[u(w. + T. + t ) + u(w. + T + t) 
T t 1 
1 1 1 1 x—1 i+1 i+1 
i' i 
+ Iu(w. + T,) + u(w + t)]} + a[v(T ) + v(t )j 1 1 i+1 1 i I 
(subject to non—negativity constants). We note in passing that when it 
equals either 3 or 1 (so that information is complete), this 
definition reduces to the sore standard notion of a Nash equilibrium. 
Throughout much of our analysis, we will assume that resources are 
initially distributed evenly within generations. That is, 
W, =W 
1 
w = w 
1 
fcr all i. When we assume symmetric endowments, we will also focus 
attention on symmetric equilibria, which have the property that the 
magnitudes of all transfers (conditional upon the parent being 
* * * 
altruistic) are identical (i.e., T. = t. = T for all i 1 1 
We now present three technical results which justify the 
comparative statics performed in subseqnt sections. The first of 
these establishes existence. 
Theorem 1: For all endowment profiles (W,w.) , a BNE exists. 1 1 i1 
Next, we show that symmetric equilibria do indeed exist when 
endowments are symmetric. 
Theorem 2: If endowments are distributed symmetrically, then 
* 
there exists a symmetric BNE. Furthermore, the associated transfer, T 
is independent of N. 
The second portion of this result establishes that the allocation of 
resources is in some important sense independent of population size. 
This conolusion wIll feature prominently in the ensuing analysis. 
Finally, we establish a iqueness result. 
Theorem 3: If a > 0 or it > 0, then there is a unique BNE. If 
a = 0 and a = 0, 
When altruism is imperfect (a or it positive), equilibrium is unique. 
In particular, we lose nothing at all by focusing on symmetric 
equilibria for the case of symmetric endowments. In a frictionless 
world, there mey indeed be a multiplicity of equilibria (more on this 
later), but all such equilibria are equivalent, so once ain our 
analysis involves no loss of generality. 
Throughout the following sections, we will focus on interior 
equilibria (i.e., parents meke positive transfers to their children). 
Since we will be priuarily concerned with environments that are "almost" 
symmetric and frictionless, it is sufficient to assume that 
u'(W) < u'(w) 
As a final preliminary step, we describe two types of "fiscal" 
policies of particular interest. The first of these corresponds to the 
use of governnt debt. The level of debt, 8, affects endowments as 
follows: 
-.9— 
dw. 
1 
for all i. That is, the government redistributes resources from the 
younger generation to the older generation, presunbly by deferring 
taxes into the future. Note that this experiment is a pure case of 
intergenerational redistributIon, since all members of the same 
generation are affected identically. - 
The second type of fiscal policy considered here amounts to a pure 
redistributions within the parents' generation. In particular, . 
represents a transfer to parent p, financed out of "general revenues' 
dW. I if ji 
d. 1 
—1/(N — 1) otheraise 
It would also be natural to analyze a third type of OliC 
consisting of redistributions within the children's generation. 
Analytically, such policies are extremely similar to redistributions 
within the parent's generation, so we do not consider them explicitly. 
Note that, taken together, these three sets of instruments are 
comprehensive, in the sense that they allow the governrint to achieve 
any conceivable distribution of resources. 
Throughout the rest of this paper, we focus on the extent to which 
fiscal instruments redistribute consumption in equilibrium. For each 
policy p (where p is either public debt, 5, or an intragenerational 
transfer, tj, we define a distributional index: 
—10— 
N dC dc. 
= (Ii + j =1 
The logic of this index is straightforward. If the policy p has no 
effect on the consumption of any individual, then R = 0. Thus, 
0 corresponds to the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis, and 
R 1 = for all i corresponds to the Rernheim—Bagwell neutrality 
proposition. Note also that, in the absence of operative 
intergenerational linkages, for each of the policies described - 
above, R =- 1 (redistributing endowments leads to a one—for—one 
redistribution of consumption). Thus, a iue of R between 0 and 
1 tells us how closely behavior conforms to each of the polar cases. 
3, Perfect Aitni 
We begin by considering a frictionless world, in which altruism is 
perfectly nonpaternalistic (a = = 0). Since such environrnts have 
received much prior attention (see rro [1974] and Bernheim and gwell 
[1988]), this section contains no new results as such. Rather, we 
restate known neutrality results within the context of our current model 
in order to provide a "base case" with which to compare the results of 
subsequent sections. 
Under the assumptions specified in section 2, an interior 
equilibrium nust satisfy 
(4A) u(C) = u(c) 
(4B) u(C.) = u(c) 
—11— 
where 
* * * C =L —T. —t 
1 1 1 i 
and 
* * * 
c. = w. + T, + t. 1 1 1 i—I 
for all i. Given our concavity assumptions, these conditions are also 
sufficient to establish an equilibrium. Note that (4A), (4B), (5A), and 
(58) form a system of 4N equations in 4N unknowns. Ordinarily, one 
would think that the system would be fully determined. However, brief 
inspection reveals that one of the equations given in (4A) and (48) is 
redundant (recall that 0N1 
S 01). Thus, the system is under— 
determined. 
This does not, however, reflect real indeterrniriancy of resource 
allocation. To see this, we sum (5A) and (58) over i to obtain 
* * 
(C. + c. — w. — w. ) = o 1 1 1 1 
Note that (4A), (4B), and (6) (omitting the redundant equation) form a 
system of 2N equations in 2N unknoms. Accordingly, it seems likely 
that consumption is fully determined. In fact, we have already 
established that there is a a-uique solution to this system of equations 
(Theorem 3). 
In contrast, transfers are indeterminant. To understand this 
point, refer ain to figure 1. Suppose that an equilibrium prevails. 
If every parent simply increases T. by $1 and decreases t by $1, 
—12— 
the allocation of real resources retrains unchanged. Thus, the new 
profile of transfers is also an equilibrium. Equilibrium transfers are 
therefore defined only up to an additive constant, with the sole 
restriction that all transfers sist be positive. 
Accordingly, we ny ignore transfers completely, and describe the 
equilibrium consumption profile directly through equations (4A), (4B), 
and (6), Simple inspection of these equations reveals that the 
allocation of resources depends only upon total wealth, 
N 
] (W. + 
i=1 
Changes in the distribution of wealth have no effect on the consumption 
of any individual. 
Several neutrality results follow immediately from this 
observation. We begin with rro's [1974] well—iciown version of 
Ricardian equivalence: 
Propositioni: If a=it=O, then 5 =0. 
The proof simply consists of noting that 
+ wj) = 0 
and invoking the preceding observations. 
Bernheis and Bagwell [1988] have criticized rro's analysis on 
two grounds. First, they argue that, in a world with intrafamily 
linkages, rro' s assumptions (perfect non—çaternalistic altri.iism 
—13— 
coupled with operative transfers) imply that all redistributional 
policies are neutral. In the current context, we obtain 
Proposition 2: if 5 = = 0, then R 0 for all i 
This result follows directly from the observation that 
(i (. + )) = 0 
3 i1 
analogously to Proposition 1. 
Proposition 2 indicates that policies that redistribute resources 
beten apparently unrelated members of the same generation have no 
effects on resource allocation. Using this result, one can also show 
that, in somewhat more elaborate environments, apparently distortionary 
taxes have no effects on behavior, and that prices are not only 
indeterminate, but also play no role in the resource allocation process 
see Bernheim and gwell [1988] and Bernheim [1986]). 
Bernheim and Bagwell also offered, but did not emphasize, a second 
criticism of the dynastic framework: as the population size increases, 
each individual's merginal propensity to consume out of his own wealth 
falls to zero. As we shall see, this observation turns out to be 
particularly important in models that incorporate small amounts of 
friction, in the current context, we have 
* 
dC. 
Proposition 3: If a = = 0, lim = 0 for all I. 
N- i 
To establish Proposition 3, we argue as follows. 8y Proposition 2 
(along with a similar result for children), equalizing the distribution 
—14- 
of resources within generations has no effect on consumption. Thus, we 
can invoke Theorem 3, to conclude that the distribution of consumption 
is symmetric both before and after the incremental infusion of wealth. 
It is trivial to check that C (s C for all i) and c (a c for 
1 1 
all i) are both increasing in aggregate resources. Thus, 
dC./dW. < i/N, from which the result follows immediately. 
Empirically speaking, Proposition 2 (along with its corollaries) 
and Proposition 3 are both untenable, Indeed, since these properties do 
not hold even as an approximation in the raal. world, eality is in dome 
critical sense not even approximately like the model described here. 
Accordingly, rnheim and gwell conclude that it is inapropriate to 
take the Ricardian equivalence result even as a "rule of thumb" guide to 
policy, without first specifying the nature of the approximation in 
great detail. We undertake this task in subsequent sections, 
4. Joy of Giving 
in this section we analyze the case in which all parents are 
altruistic and, in addition, care directly about the size of the 
transfers they aeke. Formally, a > 0 and m = 0. Parent i chooses 
the transfers T1 and t to satisfy 
(7A) u'(C.) = u'(c.) + av'(T) 
(7E) 
u'(C1) 
= u'(c.1) + av'(t) 
In deciding on the optimal transfers, parent i considers reducing his 
owr consumption, C, by one unit. If he transfers this unit to child 
—15— 
1, the parent's utility is increased by u'(c) + mv'(Tj; if he 
transfers this unit of consumption good to child i + 1, then the 
parent's utility is increased by u'(c11) + av'(t.). The first—order 
conditions (7A) and (7B) show that a consumer chooses T1 and t so 
that the rrarginal utility loss from decreasing his own consumption is 
equal to the nBrginal utility in from increasing either T or t.. 
To obtain comparative static results for this model, one 
differentiates the entire system formed by equations (7A) and (7B) (for 
each i), along with the budget constraints. The following result is 
extremely helpful for evaluating the effects of specific policy 
exercises. 
Theorem 4: If it = 0, > 0, and the initial distribution of 
endowments is symmetric, then 
= j-k + - - X) ) 
v(T) + 
u"(c) 
where X solves 
—1 v"(T) v"(T) [av"(Tfl2 X = 2[1 + u"(c) + u"(C) + u"(C)u"(c) 
Since the formula for X is quadratic, there are, of course, two 
solutions. Given the nature of this formula, one root is simply the 
inverse of the of the other. If a ) 0, then the expression on the 
right hand side strictly exceeds 2, so that one solution exceeds unity, 
—16— 
while the other lies beeen C and 1, It is easy to check that the 
value of dC/dW does not depend upon whether one uses the larger or k 
smaller root. For convenience, we henceforth adopt the convention that 
0 < X < 1. 
Now consider the effects of a Ricardian redistribution in which 
is increased by one unit and w is decreased by one unit for all 
i. It is of course feasible for all C and c to remain unchanged 
in the face of this experirint, However, this inriance of consumption 
is not, in general, optimal as argued below. - 
Suppose that all parents intain their own consumption unchanged 
and increase T1 and t each by 1/2, In this case all c. will be 
mchanged. However, the first—order conditions (7A) and (7B) will fail 
to be satisfied because the increase in transfers leads to a reduction 
in av'(T.) and av'(t). Therefore, the narginal utility of parent i's 
consumption, u'(Ci), would exceed the right—hand sides of (7A) and (7B), 
which represent the narginal utility associated with an additional 
transfer. To re—establish optimality, parent i would increase his own 
consumption and decrease his transfers. Therefore, the Ricardian 
experiment increases the consumption of parents and reduces the 
consumption of children. 
The argument that consumption would not remain unchanged in the 
face of a Ricardian experinnt ss based on the fact that increased 
transfers would reduce av'(T1) and av'(t.) and therefore violate the 
first—order conditions (7A) and (7B). However, if a is srrll then 
this effect will be small and the impact on consumption will be minimal. 
—17— 
Thus, we would expect the effect of deficits on consumption to be 
continuous in a. Likewise, one would expect to obtain a similar 
continuity property with respect to the effect of transfer policies on 
consumption. Formelly, we have 
Proposition 4: If m = 0 and the initial distribution of 
6 i 
endowments is symmetric, then urn R = urn R = 0. 
a+0 
Proposition 4 tails us that by taking friction to be small we can 
obtain both Ricardian equivalence and the stronger neutrality properties 
as arbitrarily good approximations. By itself, this result does not 
bolster the Ricardian position. However, the key point is that for ¶. 
the quality of the approximation depends upon N, whereas for & it 
does not. Indeed, since public debt does not alter the symmetry of 
a 
endowments, then by Theorem 2 R is completely independent of N. In 
contrast, R 
' varies with systematically with N. 
In keeping with the intuition given in the introduction to this 
paper, we wish to explore the behavior of R as N becomes very 
large. We therefore consider in detail the effect of t. on the 1 
distribution of consumption in large economies. Note that dC/d is 
the sum of tao components: (1) the direct effect of the increase in 
parent is wealth, dC/dW; and (2) the effect on parent l's 
consumption of the reduction in parent j's wealth by (N — 1)1 units, 
for all j i. To evaluate these components in a large economy, we 
take the limit of the formula given in Theorem 4 (recalling that, since 
endowments are symmetric, C, , and T do not depend on N): 
—18— 
dC* 
= X)1 (2 + 
Thus, an increase in Wk has a positive effect on C. but the 
magnitude of the effect declines geometrically as j—k increases—— 
friction dissipates the effect on more distant relatives. We depict 
this pattern graphically in figure 2. 
Consider now the tao component effects of .. For a large 
economy, the effect on parent j's wealth is negligible. Indeed, it 
follows from Theorem 4 that even summing over all j I, there is no 
effect on arent i's consumption (i.e. effect (ii) above is eaual to 
zero). Intuitively, in large economies almost all j are only 
distantly related to i, so that the friction in any chain linking j 
to i almost completely dissipates the effects of changes in j's 
wealth. Thus, In a large economy, the effect on parent i's consumption 
of the redistributive transfer 'r• is the same as the effect on parent 
i's consumption of an increase In parent l's wealth (effect (i) above). 
Inspection of Theorem 4 reveals that, even in a large economy, dC/dW1 
is positive. This follows from the fact that if parent i received an 
additional ixit of wealth and did not increase his own consumption, then 
he would increase his transfers 
T1 
and 
t1, thereby increasing 
c1 
and 
c.÷1. 
In this case, the rrrginal utility of his own 
consumption, u'(C1), would exceed the right—hand sides of the first— 
order conditions (7A) and (7B). In order to satisfy the first—order 
conditions, parent i would increase his own consumption. 
—19— 
Finally, since the effects of wealth injections are localized, in 
large economies we would expect to redistribute consumption from 
the general population to the close relatives of 1, so that in the 
limit R 1 + 1. We sumrxarize these conclusions in Proposition 5. 
Proposition 5: If t = C, a > 0, and the initial distribution 
of endowments is symmetric, then lim = 1. Furthermore, 
dC* dC* 
I . I lim — lim — > 0. 
dc. dW. N-- i N 1 - 
Taken together, Propositions 4 and 5 may well appear to resolve 
the difficulties raised by Bercheim and Bagwell. Specifically, one can 
obtain Ricardian equivalence to an arbitrarily good approximation by 
taking a sufficiently small. If for a given a the population is 
sufficiently large then, as in a model with no altruistic linkages, a 
one dollar intragenerational transfer will redistribute one dollar of 
I 
consumption in equilibrium (i.e. P 1 1). The recipient of such a 
transfer will act as though he has received an injection of new wealth—— 
that is, he will completely ignore the fact that the governrrent acquired 
these resources by levying taxes on individuals to whom the recipient is 
operatively linked. Taking the population to be large does not, 
however, affect the approximate validity of Ricardian equivalence, Thus, 
with a small and N large relative to a1, deficits are approximately 
neutral, but intragenerational redistributions are not. Formally, we 
have 
—20— 
Eroposition 6: There exists a decreasing function N such that 
for any sequence 
<ak,N>kl 
with ha (ak,Nk) = (0,) and 
Nk Ok) for all k, lim R 
= 0 and Urn R = 1. 
- k- 
Note that one does not obtain + 0 and R' + I for all 
sequences (ak,Nk) (o,). Nk must be sufficiently large for each 
for the argument to work. More generally, (a,,N,) + (o,) 
¶ 
consistent with any limiting value for R ', including 0. Thus, one 
cannot justify Ricardian equivalence simply by arguing that friction is 
small and the population is large. However, the logical puzzle posed by 
Bernheim and gwehl appears for the moment to be mitigated. It seems 
that one must turn to empirical evidence in order to determine whether 
the actual values of a and N are consistent with approximate 
Ricardian equivalence, but inconsistent with the collateral neutrality 
results. 
Yet this resolution is unsatisfactory. if one simultaneously 
takes a small (so that Ricardian equivalence is approxirrtely true) 
and N large (so that intragenerational transfers remain relevant), 
then in the limit each individual's consumption is necessarily unrelated 
to his own wealth. More precisely, 
Proposition 7: Suppose a = 0, and that the initial distribution 
of endowments is symmetric. Let < 
0k' Nk > be such that 
lim (ak,Nk) = (o,). Then 
—21— 
* 
dC. 
urn = k+ 1 
Thus, by introducing friction through 5, one cannot simultaneously 
resolve the difficulties raised by Propositions 2 and 3 of section 3: 
if one takes friction to be small without letting the population get 
very large, then in the limit everything is neutral; if one takes 
friction to be small while letting the population grow, then in the 
limit each individuals marginal propensity to consume out of wealth 
falls to zero. 
Propositions 6 and 7 may at first appear to be inconsistent. 
Suppose we take some sequence (ak,Nk) -* (O,) with N. > N(z) for 
each k. Sy proposition 7, we know that in the limit consumption does 
not depend upon an individual's own alth. This seems to imply that 
consumption depends upon aggregate wealth, from which it would follow 
that all redistributive policies are neutral. Quite to the contrary, 
proposition 6 tells us that R 1. The key to this puzzle is the 
fact that, in the limit, consumption is a function of local aggregates, 
rather than global aggregates. That is, the consumption of individual 
i depends only upon the wealth holdings of is close" relatives. In 
the limit, i has an infinite number of close realtives (even though 
these relatives form a negligible subset of the entire population), and 
so i's own wealth is irrelevant. However, a redistribution of one 
dollar from i to j (where I and j are only very distantly 
related) will transfer one dollar of consumption from i and his close 
relatives to j and his close relatives. 
—22— 
In summary, we find that one can simultaneously take friction 
small (a -* 0) and population large (N - ) such that Ricardian 
equivalence holds arbitrarily well, and such that redistrjbutions have 
real effects (changes in wealth only affect consumption locally). 
However, in doing so one necessarily produces an untenable result: each 
individuals' consumption is unrelated to his own wealth. 
5. Incowplete Inforation 
Now consider an economy in which a fraction it of the parents are 
selfish and the retraining fraction 1 — it of the parents are altruistic. 
Each parent knows whether he is altruistic or selfish, and knows the 
fraction it of selfish parents, but does not know whether any other 
particular parent is selfish or altruistic. For simplicity, we assume 
that there is no joy of giving motive (a 0). 
Rather than treat this case in detail, we will simply indicate its 
formal similarity to the joy of giving model. Specifically, if a > 0 
and it = 0, the utility of each parent is given by 
(6) u(C.) + [u(y.) + u(y.1)J + a [v(T.) + v(tj] 
where 
C. = W. — T — t 1 1 i I 
and 
y. = w. + T. ÷ t. 1 1 1 —1 
—23— 
Alternatively, when a = 0 and it > 0, parent is expected utility 
(given that he is altruistic) reduces to 
(9) u(C.) + (i - m)[u(y.) + u(y.1) + m[u(wj + T) ÷ u(w1÷1 + t)i 
(recall that, with incomplete information, we interpret T, and t, as 
choices conditional upon j being altruistic, with the understanding 
that j transfers nothing if he is completely selfish). 
We note four differences between (8) and (9). First, in (9) the 
second term is multiplied by (1 — it). Clearly, this difference in 
scale can have no qualitative consequences, and even quantitative 
differences disappear as it goes to 0. Second, in (9) the third term 
is multiplied by it rather than . Yet both it and a are riasures 
of friction. Merely changing the index is inconsequential. Third, in 
(9) u() appears in place of v(). Since we never ruled out the 
possibility that u(s) and v() are identical, this too is 
irrelevant. Finally, in (9) w + T. appears in place of T 
(likewise w. + t. in place of t.). Clearly, this cannot affect i+1 1 1 
comparative statics for the instruments t., since w. in independent 
of t 1 
Given the strong similarities between (8) and (9), it should not 
be surprising that formal analysis of the two models is virtually 
identical. We therefore treat these models simultaneously in Appendix A 
by analyzing a slightly sore general formulation that subsumas both 
specifications. Since Appendix A gives a complete characterization of 
comparative statics for the general formulation, it is possible to 
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obtain direct analogs of Propositions 4 through 7 for the case of 
a = 0, it > 0 by mimicking the proofs in Appendix C. We leave details 
to the interested reader. 
6. 
Despite its apparent promise, the introduction of friction does 
not appear to resolve successfully all of the puzzles posed in Bernheim 
and gwell's analysis. We now turn to a less obvious alternative, 
which 15 isotivated by the empirical obsertion that testators often 
choose to divide bequests equally among their heirs (see Menchik 
- 
[1980]). This phenornon has puzzled previous analysts, in that it 
appears to contradict the implications of all widely subscribed theories 
concerning bequest motives (see the discussion in rnheim, Shleifer and 
Summers [198]). We offer no new explanation of equal division here, 
but rather simply assume that altruistic rents rraximize utility 
subject to an elithrian constraint. Like the introduction of friction 
in section 4, the constraint itself is somewhat ad hoc, but, as we shall 
see, its introduction generates some intniiging implications. We leave 
the task of justifying the equal division assumption for future work. 
Accordingly, we set a = it = 0, and modify our basic model by 
assuming that parent p. maximizes utility subject to the constraint 
that 
t. = T. 
1 1 
Formally, Theorems I through 3 do not apply to this case. We therefore 
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provide the following result: 
Theorem 5: Suppose a = it = 0, and that parents face egalitarian 
constraints. For every endowment profile there exists a 
unique equilibrium. Furthermore, if endowments are distributed 
symmetrically, then the equilibrium is symmetric, and the associated 
* 
equilibrium transfer, T , is irideendent of N. 
As in section 4, it is useful to derive some preliminary 
comparative static results that allow us to compute the effects of 
various policy experiments. We therefore provide the following theorem: 
Therem 6: Suppose a = it = 0, and that parents face egalitarian 
constraints. Let initial endowments be distributed symmetrically. Then 
dC 
—2\(1 + XN)_1(l — N)_1(1 — X)1 for j = k 
k (-kl + XN 3I)(1 + )(i — N)_1(1 — )_1 otherwise 
where X solves 
+X_1240) 
Once again, the formula for X is quadratic. Since the right 
hand side is strictly less than —2, one solution is less than —1, 
while the other lies beten 0 and —1 (one is simply the reciprocal 
of the other). For convenience, we choose the second root (both yield 
the same value of dC/dWk) and adopt the convention that 0 > 
X > —1. 
We begin our analysis of egalitarian altruism by noting that 
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Ricaran equivalence holds exactly (i.e., not approximately, as in the 
preceding sections). To establish this property, we need not assume 
that endowments are distributed symmetrically——the result obtains even 
when the financial status of children differs within families, 
Proposition 8: Suppose a = it = 0, harents face 
litarian constraints. Then Rd = 
it is important to qualify Proposition 8 in the following way. 
The previous models yielded Ticardia equivalence (or approxirnat 
equivalence) for all transfers involving a parent and his children, 
Here, that is not the case, Policies that entail differential treatment 
of children within the same family y well have real effects, since the 
egalitarian constraint prevents parents from offsetting such redistri— 
butions, 
This observation leads naturally into our next result. Just as 
the equal division requirement prevents parents from offsetting 
redistributions within the family, it precludes private individuals from 
offsetting more complex transfer policies. Suppose for example that the 
government taxes parent p., and distributes the procedes to P. In 
the absence of elitarianism, p. will decrease t by the amount of 
his incremental tax, and p1+1 will raise T1 by his incremental 
subsidy. In the presence of an elitar1an constraint, these 
alternatives are proscribed. Instead, the actual responses of p and 
p11 will offset the policy only partially. 
Accordingly, one might well suspect that egalitarianism introduces 
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a kind of friction, which attenuates the effects of a perturbation as 
one moves further from its source. In large populations, one might once 
ain find that policies of iritragenerational redistribution lead to 
sensible consequences. Taking limits of the formulas in theorem 6 (and 
recalling that, with symmetric endowments, k and the equilibrium 
allocation are independent of N), we obtain 
dC* 
1 
— 
dW 
— 
— / , an 
3 
dC 
dW1 = l3kI( + X)(1 - )_1 for j k 
As expected, the effect of p.'s wealth on p's consumption declines 
geometrically as j becomes "distant" from i. However, the most 
striking feature of these formulas follows from the fact that X is 
negative. Accordingly, a windfall for parent p. raises the 
consumption of p. (i j) when i — j is odd, and lowers it when 
i — j is even (see figure 3). 
A moment's reflection suggests that this pattern is quite natural. 
In response to an infusion of wealth, parent p1 increases both his 
consumption and his transfers. Upon seeing that one child (k.,k+1) 
is better off, parents p,1 and p÷ choose to consume more and 
transfer less. As a result, the resources of children k. and k. i—i i+2 
fall. Parents p2 and p.2 respond by choosing to consume less, 
and transfer more. The pattern then repeats. 
From these results it is easy to establish the relevance of 
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intragenerational redistributions in large econornies In fact, parent 
p will respend to a transfer funded from general revenues (rn ) just 1 
as he would to an injection of new wealth; furthermore, the pure wealth 
affect does not anish as the population grows 
2Etion9: Suppose a = = 0, and that parents face 
tarian constraints, Let initial endowments be distributed 
dC dC rn 
symmetrically. Then lim ho 
-- 
> 0, and Urn 8 > 1. 
- N 'i N- 
This result has one rather peculiar implication, which is that an 
intragenerational transfer has a larger redistributive effect on 
consurrtion if there are egalitarian intergenerational transfers, than 
if there are no private transfers at all (i.e. R' > 1). That is, 
contrary to the implications of previous analyses, private transfers 
serve to magnify rather than dampen the redistributive effects of 
government policies, 
Even so, it might appear that egalitarianism provides the ideal 
resolution to the paradoxes raised by Bernheim and Eagwehl. After all, 
one obtains exact Ricardian equivalence without assuming that this 
source of friction is small. In contrast to previous sections, one need 
not pass to o limits simultaneously, thereby producing a paradoxical 
wealth effect. 
Yet this conclusion is premature, for the imposition of egalita- 
rianism produces a paradox of its own. Specifically, consider the 
welfare effects of an exogenous increase in the wealth of some 
consumer. Ordinarily, we would think of this occurrence as 
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unambiguously desirable. Not so within the context of the current 
rnodelr Indeed, roughly speaking, only one half of the population would 
benefit, while the other half would lose. Formally, 
Proposition 10: Suppose = = 0, and that parents face 
egalitarian constraints. Let initial endowments be distributed 
symmetrically. 
a) If N is even and 3 1, then dtj/dW1 < 0 1ff 3 is odd. 
b) If N is odd and I niin(j, N — 3 ÷ 2) < N/2, then 
- 
dU/dW1 < 0 111 min(j, 
N — 3 + 2) is odd. 
Thus, an exogenous increase in the wealth of any given consumer is 
never a Pareto improvement. The intuition for this result follows 
directly from our discussion of figure 3; if parents j — 1 and 3 ÷ 1 
consume more (and, accordingly, give less to their children), then the 
resources of js family have declined, and 3 crust be worse off even 
after adjusting his own behavior optimally. 
The reader may well feel that the implications of Proposition 10, 
while surprising, are not obviously counterfactual. We do not deny 
this. We merely note that one cannot accept the egalitarian framework 
without reexamining the validity of some very basic premises, and 
abandoning most simple guides to welfare analysis. 
7. Closing Reirks 
In closing, it is important to emphasize that we have conducted 
this analysis in a way that is likely to significantly overstate the 
plausibility of approximately Ricardiari worlds. More generally, the 
—30— 
case for Ricardian equivalence is even less compelling for two reasons. 
First, our model spans only two generations. While it is 
therefore adequate for analyzing the effects of deferring taxes to the 
next generation, it is unsuited for drawing inferences about the impact 
of longer term debt, Just as friction compounds through successive 
linkages between families, it will also compound as intergenerational 
chains lengthen. Accordingly, in a more general model, we would expect 
to find that relatively temporary deficits are approxirrately neutral, 
while relatively permanent ones are not. - 
Second, intrafamily linkages are actually much more complicated 
than the network modelled here. As we extend consideration to a larger 
number of generations, we generate a proliferation of paths linking 
different members of the same generation (see Bernheim and gwell, 
section 4, for a detailed discussion). Linkages actually fora a "web", 
rather than the circle illustrated in figure 1 As a result, the 
"distance" between two arbitrarily selected individuals may be quite 
small on average, even when the population is quite large. Suppose, for 
example, that we add one more generation, meintaining our assumption 
that every parent has two children, and every child two parents. Then, 
ioring redundancies (i.e., sibling don't have the same in—laws), each 
grandparent is directly linked through his grandchildren to 10 other 
grandparents, who are in turn linked to 10 others, and so forth. This 
suggests that each household is connected through chains involving L 
or fewer links to on the order of other households, rather than to 
only 2L households, as in the current model. Formal analysis of 
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random graphs indicates that this intuition is essentially correct (see 
Bollabas [1981]). 
These observation suggest that, in a more realistic model, the 
Bernheim—Bagwell puzzles would be much more roixist. If most individuals 
are connected through relatively few links, then it may be very 
difficult to eliminate the approximate neutrality of intragenerational 
transfers without assuming a or it very large. Similarly, each 
individual would in such a world have a tremendous number of "close" 
relatives so that, once agedn, the marginal propensity to consume out of 
own wealth might be extremely small in the absence of large friction. 
Overall, it is very difficult to see how one could introduce just 
enough friction in a model with a realistic pattern of interfamily 
linkages to produce approximate Ricardian equivalence without also 
generating untenable results as in Bernheim and Sagwell. Jhile one can, 
perhaps, avoid these problems by invoking an egalitarian constraint, 
this alternative seems very ad hoc, and in addition generates some 
disturbing welfare results. Conseqntly, the theoretical case for 
Ricardian equivalence remains tenuous at best. 
xA 
Complete Comparative Statics for Joy of Giving 
and Incomplete InfornEtion Models 
This appendix presents the comparative statics analysis of a model 
that nests the joy of giving model in Section 4 and the incomplete 
inforn'tion model in Section 5. Recall that 
C. = consurrtion of adult i 
= consumption of child i 
- 
= wealth of adult i 
= wealth of child i 
= transfer from adult i to child i 
= transfer from adult i to child i + 1. 
Also recall that 
(Al) C. = W. — T. t. 1 1 1 1 
Let y denote the consumption of child i if he receives transfers from 
adults i and i — 1, 
(A2) = + T. + t1_1 
Let 
(A3) Z. = w1 + T. 
(A4) 
z1 
= + t. 
where is a dummy variable. In particular, if = 0, then Z is 
the transfer from adult i to child i and z is the transfer from 
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adult I to child i + 1. Alternatively, if 1, then Z is the 
consumption of child i if he does not receive a transfer from adult 
I — 1; z. is the consumption of child I + 1 if he does not receive a 
transfer from adult i + 1. 
Now suppose that adult i chooses T1 and t to rrexiniize 
(A5) u(C.) + L[u(y.) u(y.1)J + w(Z) + w(zjj 
The equations (Al — A) contain both the joy of giving model and the 
incomplete inforrration model. To obtain the joy of giving model, set 
p , ii = a, = 0 and w() = v(). Alternatively, to obtain the 
private information model, set p = (i — it), r = sit, = 1, and 
= u(). 
The first—order conditions are obtained by substituting (Al — A4) 
into (A5) and differentiating with respect to T1 and t1: 
(A6a) (T.) —u'(C.) + u'(y.) ÷ nw'(Z.) = 0 
(A6b) (t.) 
_ut(C) ÷ pu'(y + T1w'(z.) = 0 
Now totally differentiate the first—order conditions with respect to 
T., t., W and w. to obtain 1 1 i 1 
(A7a) —u"(C.)[dW. — dT. — dtij + u'(y.)[dw1 + dT + dt.1J 
+ T)W"(Z4)[dW7 + dT1J = 0 
(A7b) —u"(C.)[dW. — dT1 — dtj + u"(y. 1)[dw. 1 + dT.1 + dtj 
+ w"(z. )[dw. + dt1J = 0 
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e assume that initially W. = W and W1 = W for all i, and we 
restrict our attention to syametric equilibria. Let 
a 5 u"(C,) + u"(y.) + nw"(z.) < 0 
b a u"(C.) < 0 
e xu(y.) 0 
f 5 w"(z.) 0 
and observe that a = b + e + f < 0. Using the definitions of a b, e 
and f we can rewrite (A7a, b) as 
(ABa) a dT. + b dt, + a dt. = b dU. — (e + f)dw. 1 1 i—I 1 1 
(A8b) b dT. + a dt. + e dT. = b dW, — (e ÷ f)dw. 1 1 i+1 1 i+1 
Let x• be a 2 1 column vector such that x = [dT,, dt]. The linear 1 1 1 1 
difference equation system in (A8) can be written as 
ra bi r o —e1 [b dW1 
— (e + f)dw1 
(A.9) 1[x] = 1 1 [x.] + 
Le 0] L—b —a] 1 b dW.1 — (e + f)dw. 
Now observe that 
(Alo) 
[: :r=[; J 
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and then pre—multiply both sides of (A9) by the rratrix on the right—hand 
side of (MO) to obtain 
x.=Mx. +g, 
3 3—1 3 
where 
b 
_a 
e e 
2 
a e a 
+ 
e b be 
and 
PdW. - (i +—)dw. 
e j—l e 
g = 
LdW. 
- dW.1 - i)(e + f) 
The behavior of x. = [dT., dt.J is governed by the linear difference 
3 3 3 
equation in (All) and the boundary condition that 
= 
MxN 
The boundary condition in (A12) exploits the fact that the N adults 
are located around a circle and adult I is formally the same as adult 
N + 1. 
For the purposes of our analysis, it is sufficient to allow 
and g2 to be nonzero and to restrict 8. 0 for j = 3,4,5,..., N. 
In this case, it follows from (All) and (A12) that 
2 
= M + Mg1 + g2 
—36— 
and 
(A14) xN = MN2X2 
Substituting (A14) into (A13) yields an expression for in terms of 
the exogenous changes g1 and 
(A15) = (I — MN) 1{Mg1 ÷ g2] 
Using the boundary condition in (A12), the expression for x2 in(A15) 
and the fact that x. = N3 for j = 2,,.. ,N we have a complete 
solution for 
x1,. ...,XN. 
N—i N—i 
(A16a) 
x1 
= M (I — N ) [Mg1 + g2] + 
(A16b) x. = M2(I - MN) 1[Mg1 + g2] ; j 2,.. .,N 
Let < be the two characteristic roots of the rtrix N. Observe 
that 
(A17a) + = tr M = a - - e2 > 
(A17b) = det M = 1 
It follows from (A17b) that and are reciprocals of each 
other. Let X denote the smaller root X1. It follows from (A17a) 
that both roots, X and are positive. 
It can be directly verified that the ntrix N can be written as 
(A18a) N = PAP1 
—37— 
where 
1 1 
(A18b) p = I 1 
L (b÷eX) — (b÷eX1) 
k 0 
(A18c) A= 
1 
and 
- 
+ eX) -a 
(Alad) = 
— ? ) (b + eX) a 
Now observe that 
j—2 N —1 j—2 N —1 —1 (k19) N (I — N ) = PA (I — A ) 
Substituting (AlSb) and (AlBc) into (A19) yields 
r -2 
(A2o) M2(I - MN)I = 1 
I — 
'(b+eX)X2 (b+eX_1)X(2) 
We are now prepared to analyze two comparative statics 
exercises. First, we examine the effects of an increase in the wealth 
of parent 1. In particular, we let dW1 > 0 and 
dW =. . . =dW =dw =. . .=dw =0. Inthiscasewehave 2 n 1 N 
(A21a) g1 [] dW1 
—38— 
r 
a I 
g2=1 JdW1 
L e 
and 
r b-a 
I e 
(A22) Mg1 + g2 = dW1 12 2 
a —e —ab 
L be J 
Using (A17a) we can rewrite (A22) as 
rb—a 
e 
] 
dW1 Mg1 
+ g2 = b — a 
+ A + La 
New cbserve that 
b-a 
- (b — a)C + a(X + b + a) — 
(A24) F{Ng1+g2] = 
1 r 
e 
dW1 
b-a 
e(A_X)L(b+) (b—a)X+a(X+C1) I a 
Observe frcm (A17a) that 
—1 
(A25) (b + a)(b - a)/a = —bR + A ) - a 
Substituting (A25) into (A24) yields 
A+ 1 
1 
b-a 
a 
dW1 
(A26) 2[Mg1 + g2 = A — A1 [ b—a —1 a J & —1 
—39— 
Pre—multiply (A26) by (A20) and use (A16b) to obtain 
N 
_1)_1 j—2 N—+2 
b—a j—l N_÷l) — x .=1—? ) — + x — (x ÷ x 
r 
e 
(A27) I 1 b-a XJ 
[ 
L(b + eX)(1 + 
—1 b—a—1 N 
+ (b + e )(1 + e 
To simplify (A27) recall that the roots = X and = satisfy the 
characteristic equation — tr N + det 0 whicn can be written as 
I I 
2 2 2 2 
(A28) beX = (a — b — e — be I i 
Now observe that 
b_a 1{( 2 2 2 (A29)(b + eX )(i + = — be - ae)X, + (e + b — ab)X + be} I e i e 1 
Substituting (A28) into the right—hand side of (A29) yields 
(A30) (b eX )(i + — 
a 
_aX.L+X, i=1,2 1 a i 1 e j 
Substituting (A30) into (A27) yields 
k +X + 
e (1 — XN)l(x — k1)1 
[ 
3-2 N—j+2 b—a 
+ 
dW (A31) 
+ XN_3 
b - a (X1 N_+1) +e 
I = 2,... 
To calculate 
x1, observe from (A12) and (A14) ttat x1 
= 1N_l + g. 
Formally, xi can be written as XN1 + where 
= (O,dW1). 
Therefore 
Equation (A34) can be rearranged to yield 
(A3 5) 
N—i—i 
x.=PA (I—A) P 
N—i b—a N 
+ (X +1)1 e 
dW1 N-i b — a 
(XN + l)J +x + e 
2 
—a +ae I b+e + 
P1g 
1+— r b I 
— 
— 
e 
1 
e( - h_i) 2 dw1 a —ae 
b 
— = N_1 
(A32) 
Now we consider the alternative exercise of increasing the wealth 
of child 1- by dw1 > 0.- In this 
case 
(A33) = 1 + ) 
[a e1 
dw1 
and 
g2 
= = = 0. 
In this case, x. = M2(I — MN) iMg1 which can be written as 
(A34) x. = PA2(I — AN)P_1FAP_1g1 j = 2,., .,N 
It follows from (Aied) and (A33) that 
(A3 6) 
—41— 
2 2-b2-ae 
-a + ae a Now observe that eX. + b + = ek — so that in b I b 
light of (A17a), 
2 2 
(A37) eX, + —a 
+ ae 
= e{X — ( + X ) — e — set + b I j j be 
Simplifying (A'7) yields 
2 
A38) eX. + b — a — ae = e{-X. + b 
Recalling tnat X = X and X2 H, we can use (A38) to rewrite (A36) as 
a—e 
— X 
e (A39) Pg1 = -1 
j 
s—e 
Now use (A19), A2O), A35) and (A39) to obtain 
N—i —i—iT —i a—e —1 ';_÷ii 
+ 
—)(i — X ) (k — X ) r —(X + X j + (X + X ) e 
(Mo) 1 
- at 4 eX)1 - lj_1 
L (b + eX)[ - X1 
j =2,...,N. 
To simplify (MO) observe that 
(A41) (b + ek )(a — e — x.) = {ab — be # (me — e2 b2 — beX I 
Substituting (A28) into (Ml) yields 
(A42) (b+eX.)(a_e_X)=a(l eaX) i b 1 + b i 
—42— 
Substituting (A42) into (A4O) yields 
= + — 
- + 
(A43) dw 
+ 
j = 2,... ,N. 
To calculate x1, note that forrrelly x1 
= + g1. Using (A43) and 
(P33) we obtain 
- - 
- 
= (i + i N)-l( 1)1 (x +xNi) (1 + 
(A44) dw1 
L1 + XN) + (x + 
Appendix B 
Egalitarieni am 
This appendix presents the oompantive statics analysis of the 
economy in whioh all parents divide their estates equally among their 
ohildren. Recall that 
= consumption of adult i 
ci = consumption of child i 
= wealth of adult i 
= wealth of child i 
= transfer from parent i to child i, which equals transfer 
from parent i to child i + 1. 
Observe that 
(31) c. = w. — 2'T. 1 1 1 
-43- 
and 
(32) csw +T1 +Ti_i 
Parent i chooses Ti to .mximize 
(33) u(ci; 
+ $u(o) + 
and the first-orGer condition for tots razisization problem is 
(34) 
_2u'(Ci) + u'(o) + B&(ci+i) a 0 
Totally differentiating this first—order condition with respect to Ti. 
and Wj yields 
_2u*(Ci)(dwi — 2dTi] + uM(ci)(dvi d''i + dTii] 
(35) t Pu"(ci+i)(dwi+i + dTi + 
We assume that initially '¼ — W and Vi — " for all i, and we 
restrict our attention to syrntrio equilibria. Let 
a 4u(Ci) + 2Pu"(oi) < 
b ! 2u"(Ci) < o 
e s $u(oi) < 
and observe that a — 2(b + e). Using the definitions of a, b, and e, 
we oem write (35) as 
e dT,1 + a dTi + e dTi+i — b Si — e — e (86) 
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The second—order linear difference equation in (BE) can be written 
in companion form by defining the 2 X 1 column vector as 
x. = [dT., dT.1] Therefore, 
x. = Mx. + h. I = 2,...,N 1 i—i 1 
where 
—1 
e L1 o 
h. = [ dW.1 — (dw1 + dwj1 
The behavior of is governed by (B7) and the boundary condition 
= Mx + h1 
The boundary condition in (Be) reflects the fact that formally adult 1 
may be represented as adult N + 1. 
For the purposes of our analysis, it is sufficient to allow h1 
and h2 to be nonzero and to restrict h 
= 0 for i = 3,4,5,... ,N. ifl 
this case, it follows from (B7) and (Be) that 
N—2 
x =M x 
2 
= 
.M XN 
+ + 
x. = M2x2 for j = 2,... ,N, we can use — B1) 
solution for 
N—i N 1r 
='4 (I—N) L1+h2i4h1 
i—2 N—i 
= (: — M / [Nn + h2j i = 2, . . . N 
Let ) A2 be the two ccaracteristic roots of the catrjx '4. 
Observe that 
(Bt2a) + '2 tr K = — < —2 
(312b) i 2 = bet '4 = 
It follows from (Bi2bj that the 
Let k be the larger root 
(Bi2a) that < -i < < 0. 
It can be directly verified that the riatrix '4 can be written as 
'4 = PAPi (Bi a) 
where 
ii 
rx 0 
A = 
L o 
—45— 
Using the fact that 
to obtain a complete 
(Blia) 
(Bitt) x. 
roots are reciprocals of each other. 
therefore X = It follows from 
(B13b) 
(Bi 3c) 
—46— 
X —1 
(213d) = 
1 
— 
X — Lx i- 
Now observe that 
1—2 N —1 1—2 N —1 —1 (B14) N (I—N) =PA (i—A) 
Substituting (213b, c, d) into (214) and performing the trix 
multiplication yields 
i—2 - N—i N —1. —1—1 Ei—i N—i÷i .i—2 N—i+2 I N (I—N ) = (i—h ) (—X ) I - —(h. ÷X ) 
(215) 
I i-2 N-i+2 .1-3 N-i-3 
—( ÷ ) 
We are now prepared to analyze two comparative statics exercises. 
First, we examine the effects of an increase in the wealth of adult 1. 
In particular, let dW1 > 0 and dW2 
= •.. = dW = dw1 = ... dw, = 
0 rb/e)dw, 
In this case h1 = [ j and h2 = L o } It follows from (Sub) 
and (215) that 
x. = (1 — xN)( — T1) (i_1 + XN i+1) 
(816) 1 j dW I = 2,... 
I b 1—2 N—i+2 
Therefore, 
(217) 1 = b (1 — XN)_i(x - x1)1['1 + ?N_i+i] 
-47— 
i = 
Now consider the alternative exercise of increasing the wealtn 
of child 1. In particular, let dw1 > 0 and dw2 = = dw, dW1 = 
.=dWN=O. Inthiscase,n1Ll 0J dw1 and 
h2 
= [—1 oP dw1, so that 
a-c 
Mh1 + h2 = L j dw1 
It follows from (bllbP (015) and (810) that 
N, —1 —1 —1 a - e i-i N—i÷1 i—2 N-i+2,' 
x. = (1—X ) (k—. ) (. ,i + (X + . ) 
a e (X12 1Oi+2) + (Xi_3 + 
i = 2, , N 
Therefore, - 
a — e i—i N—i+1 i—2 N—i+2 
r. e +k )+,,? +X ) 
1 1 - kN)(X - _1) 
1=1,., 
—48— 
Appendix C 
Theorem 1: Let S. = {(T,t)jT + t K W. and T, t > o}. S. is 1 — 1 = 
p's strategy space; let S1 denote an element of S4. Note that S 
is compact and convex, Further, p's utility is by assumption 
continuous in a = (sl,...,sN), and (it is easy to verify) quasi—concave 
in s.. Thus, by Debreu's {1952] Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem, 
there exists a profile of strategies (s,... ,s) which satisfies our 
definition c equilibrium. Q.E.D. 
* 
Theorem 2: In a symrrtric equilibrium with transfer level T 
* (T ,T j must satisfy 
sax u(W — T — t) + {(i — m)[u(w + T + T) + u(w + t + T)) 
T,t 
+ m{u(w + T) + u(w + t)j} + a[v(T) + v(t)] 
subject to T > 0, t > 0, and T + t < W. 5y concavity of u and v, 
we know that the solution always entails T = t, so we simply require 
* 
that T solves 
sax u(W — 2T) + 2{(1 — m)u(w + T + T) + mu(w + T)} + 2v(T) 
T 
subject to U < T K W/2. Let y: [0,W/2] - 0,W/2] be defined as 
y(T) = arg max u(W — Zr) + 2[(1 — lt)u(w + T + T) + mu(w -4- T)} + 2av(T) 
O<T<W/2 
Since this objective function is continuous and strictly concave, 
y is a continuous fumction. By the intermediate value theorem, there 
—49— 
* * * 
exists T such that T = y(T ), as required. Finally, note that the 
* 
equilibrium condition is independent of N, so T recains a symmetric 
equilibrium independent of N. 
Theorem 3 For any BNE (T,t.)1, let 
0 c =W —t. 1 1 1 1 
= w. ÷ T. ÷ t. 
1 1 1 i—i 
That is, C is p's consumption contingent upon p. being altruistic, 
and C. is KS consumption contingent JDOn p. and p. being 1 1 1 i—I 
0 oN 
altruistic. We will first establish trat (C.,c.). must be identical 1 1 i=1 
in all SNE. 
Suppose this claim is false. Then there are two SNE which give 
• 
—o —o N N 
rise to distinct profiles L,c.). and (C,c.). . Without loss 1 1 i=1 1 1 i=1 
of generality, we tray suppose that either > or > c for 
some j. 
Take first the case of > C. Through p's budget constraint, 
we see that either T, K T., or t. K t, Without loss of generality, 
we assume t. K t,. 
Now we use induction. Suppose that for some i > 0, > Ci, 
and t. K t. .. Since it must then be the case that t. . > 0, we 
3+1. 3+1 3+1 
have 
u'(C° ) < (1 — t)u'(C • ) + mu'(w. + t. .) * av'(t. •) j+i — 3+1+1 3+1 3+1 
(inequality mey occur if C.= 0). Now we are that ) 
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For suppose not. Using strict concavity of u and v, along with 
C..> C. and t. < t 
., 
wewouidhave 
3+1 3+1 j+i j+l 
u'(?.) < (i — s)u'G?1) + u'(w.1 + + 
But this implies that could increase his utility by transfering 
more to Ic. 
, 
which is a contradiction. 
3+1+1 
Next, since t. . < t. and c? > o? , then, from 3+1 3+1 3+1+1 3+1+1 
Ic. 'a budget constraint, we must have T. > T. . Since it 
3+1+1 
- 
- 3+2+1 3+1+1 - 
must then be the case that T. > C, we have 
3+1+1 - 
- 
—0 / \ —0 — / u'(C. - ) < (1 — lt)u'(c. . ) + su'(w, . + T, . ) + cv'T. 
3+1+1 — 3+1+1 3++1 3+1+1 
Now we argue that C? > C? . . For suppose not. Using strict 3+1+1 3+1+1 
concavity of u and v, along with c? . > c? . and T. . > T - * 3+1+1 3+1+1 3+1+1 3+1+1 
we would have 
u'(C? . ) < (1 — a)u'(c? . ) + au'(w. . + T. . ) + av'(T. 3+1+1 3+1+1 3+1+1 3+1+1 3+1÷1 
But this implies +i+1 could increase his utility by transferring 
more to Ic. . ; which is a contradiction. 3+1+1 
— 
—o 
Finally, if T. . > T. . and C. . > C. . , then by P. . j+i+1 j+i+1 3+1+1 3+1+1 3+1+1 
budget constraint, t. . < t. . This completes the induction step. 
3+1+1 3+1+1 
Note that induction implies c? > C and ? > c for all i. 
This violates the aggrete budget constraint. Accordingly, we have a 
contradiction for the first case. 
Now turn to the second case (c? > c? for some j). By k's 
3 3 3 
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budget constraint, either T. > T, or > t. . Witnout loss of 3 3 3— 'J— 
assume T. > T.. We have already demonstrated above that 
c. > c. and T. > I, implies C. > C This returns us to the first 3 3 3 3 3 3 
case, which yields a contradiction. 
The preceding argument suffices to establish that if m 3 and 
it = 0, all BNE yield the same allocation of consumption. Now suppose 
that > 0 or it > 0. Let denote the unique BNE 1 1 i1 
consumption profile. 
Suppose first that 0° > 0 for some j. Then either (i) T > 0 
and 
u'(C) — it)u'(c) + Bitu'(w. + T.) + av'(T.) 
or (ii) T, = 0 and 
u'(C) > (i - it)u'(c) ÷ cu'(w,) + sv'(O) 3— 3 
By strict concavity of u and v, only one of these conditions can 
hold; furthermore, (i) can hold for at most one value of T.. Thus, T. 
3 3 
is uniquely determined. We obtain t. from p's budget constraint. 
Now procede by induction. Suppose we know t. Then we obtain T1 
from k 's budget constraint. Knowing T , we can calculate t m+1 m+1 m+1 
from p1ts budget constraint. Applying induction, we conclude that 
all transfers are uniquely determined. 
Next, suppose that C = 0 for all j. Consider any i. Since 
T. + t. = W., either (i) 0 < T. < W. and 1 1 1 1 1 
(1 — lt)u'(c?) + mu'(w. + T.) + sv'(T.) = (1 - lt)u'(c?1) + 
i+1 I I — I I +ltu'(w +W —T ) ÷v'(W —T ) 
—52— 
or (ii) T. = 0 and 
(1 — + u'(w.) + av'(O) < (1 — + 
+ Ttu'(w. + w) + av'(W) 1 1 
or (iii) T. = W. and 1 1 
(1 — 5)u'(c) + u'(w. + w.) + av(W.) > (1 — + 
+ 
u'(w.1)- + v'(0) 
By strict concavity of u and -v, only one of these three conditions 
can hold; furthermore, (i) can hold for at most one value of T. 1 
Thus, T. is unicuely determined for each i, as is t. (t. = T). 1 1 1 1 
Q.E.D. 
Proofs of Propositions 1, 2, and 3 were given in the text. 
Theorem 4: The formula for X + X follows directly from 
substitution into (A17a). Without loss of generality, take k = 1. 
Then from (A32), 
dC dT dt, 
1 
1 dW 
= 
dW dW 
= 1 - 2(1 xN1( - + (1 + ;)(1 + XN\ 
= 1 — 2(1 — XN)lx — + xN_1 (1 + XN)(x + 
- (i + - (X + x1)/2)(1 + 
= 1 — 2(1 — X)1(k — — + 
—53— 
+ (av'(Ti + [vu(T)1 ÷ 
u'(C) 2u(C)u(c)' 
= 1 - 2(1 — N)_1(x — 1)_1[(j — kN)( - 
cv'(T) I av"Tj N + f M+. (i ÷) u"(c) 
N. / - N—1 —1 —1 mv"(T) ______ 1 + )1 - A ) ( — + 
as desired. From (A31). we have 
dC. dT dt. 
-- ---- 
dW 
-
dU1 dW1 
N —1 
- 
—1 —1 
-, j —2 N— +2 N— 
= i — A ) (A — X) A + 4- + 
( v"(T) j—1 - — + u"(c) + A 
= (1 - XN)_l(kl - ÷ * 2(1 + )j(k3_1 ÷ 
= (x + 4-1)(1 - )1(x1 - 2 + av\ 
Finally, note that the labelling of parents is arbitrary, so that we can 
always relabel to make any given parent p1, and either of the parents 
with whom he shares his children P2 Relabelling produces the desired 
formula. 
Proposition 4: By Theorems 2 and 3, for all symmetric endowment 
levels w and W, the unique equilibrium is symzretric. It can 
therefore be characterized by the first order condition 
u'(C) — u'(w ÷ - C) — avl(W_—_C) = o 
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Since u and v are concave, the equilibrium value of C is also the 
solution to 
W-C 
sax u(C1 ÷ u(w + W — C) + 2av( ) 
0<c<W 
(note that this yields (Ci) as the first order condition). Since this 
problem satisfies all the hypotheses of the maximum theorem, its 
solution is continuous in a. Let C° denote the equilibrium value for 
a =0 (by assumption 0 < C°< W); let C° w ÷W — C° and 
= (w - c°)/2. 
From (Ci), it follows that 
dC v"(T) 
= 
u"(C) + u"(c) + v(T) 
0 0 o 
Letting a 0 and noting that C + C , c - c , and T + T with 
C°, c0, T° > C, we immediately have ha = 0, Since c = w + W — C, 
a0 
we also have him = 0. Thus, him R = 0. 
aO a0 
Next, from Theorem 4 we have 
dC 
him = urn [(1 — XN)_ x_l — XY1a] 
a+0 I a+0 
i—i N—i÷i v"(T) jx + x 
u"(C) 2 + 
We have written this as the limit of the product of two expressions. 
Since urn ) = 1, the limit of the second expression is 4v'(T)/u'(C). 
a+0 
Note that this limit does not depend upon i. Furthermore, the first 
—63— 
As in the proof of Theorem 4, relabelling produces the desired formula 
for the derivatives with respect to 
Proposition 8: Equilibrium is characterized by the set of first 
order conditions 
+ T. + ÷ & (w. + T. TV)] = 2u(. — 1 i+1 I i+1 i+1 1 1 1 
Implicitly differentiating these conditions with respect to 6 yields 
2u"(C.) + [u"(ci) + u"(c.1)J 
dT. dT dT. dT. dT. 1 C i—i is 1 i+1 
= 4u'(C) 
— 
+ (cj( d6 ÷ + u c.1;( dô 
There are N such equations in N unknowns (the dT./do). One can 
verify by inspection that 
dT. 
1 
dó 
— 
2 
for all i satisfies these equations. From this, it is trivial to 
verify the desired result. Q.E.D. 
Proposition 9 
dC. dC. 
Part 1: urn = urn > 0 
1 N- I 
Recall that 
dO. dC 
1 
— 
__i. 
L dW. dW 
1 1 
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Since the right hand side is positive and finite, we have the desired 
conclusion. Q.E.D. 
ition5 
* 1 Fart 1: ha R = 
N÷ 
Without loss of generality, take 
him F 1 > 1, For any sequence Nk 
+ 
N- 
positive integers Mk 
+ wi±h 
=-{i 1 < i < N or k = = k 
K = {i 1 1 < < N k = = k 
= 1, First, we prove that 
choose another sequence of 
+ 0. Define - 
N—N +2Ci<N k k = = ic 
or N — N + 3 < < N k k = = k 
= + !'-l)/2 
dC, do, 
-j/2 + i€E 1 aeK, 1 k K 
dC• do. 
c' 1 \' 1 
= L —+ L — 
* 
d'r 
1 
IcKic 
1 
(where the final equality follows from 
aggregate consumption). Noting that 
dO, do, 
-÷ iP 1 1 
the fact that 
' 
does not alter 
dC. dC. N dO. 1 1 v / \1 1 
d'v =dW — L" ) 
1 1 =2 
dO, N dO, 
= (N — 1)'(N ' — 
1 31 3 
Note that 
-57— 
dC. 
—l i dC1 — I L 
along with a similar expression for and using symmetry around p, 
we have 
dC K dC. dc. 
2 > - 1)N--- 2 i=21 + 
— 2k — 2dW + dW — 
M 
dC k dT. dt. dT. dt, 
= N - 1)1NL + 2 i=21 + - (1 1 
- (2M, - 2) - 
d- 
= k - 1)_i !Nk:! + 2 2 - - 2) - 
= - 1)_i N1 - 2 j - (2Mk - 2) - 
dt dT 
where the last equality follows from the fact that = and 
1 1 
C1 
+ T1 + 
= 
W1. 
Now we take limits. Recall that the symmetric equilibrium 
allocation is independent of N. From (A1), it is obvious that since 
dtM 
Mk 
+ and N 
k 
N + as k + , then • 0 (given 0 K < i). 
Further (Nk — 1)_i + 0, N(N - + 1, and (Nk 111(Mk — 1) + 0. 
We are therefore left with lj.m R > 1, as desired. 
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Now we argue that urn 2 < 1. 
N' 
t N dC do 
1 v ( I I 2 = L + 
1=1 1 1 
= (N 1Y(N — ÷ IN — 
<(N - i1 {N( I + I) + (II + I )}/ 
- dC, - 
From Theorem 4, it is clear that > 0 for all i, It follows that 
do, 1 
> 0 for all i, othen,'ise the first order condition for some rent 
would be violated. Furthermore, from the derivation in the proof of 
proposition 4, it is clear that ' > 0 and > 0. Thus, 
< (N — 1r1N( ÷1) + N( ÷)}/2 
= (N — 1)N 
1 
From this, it is immediately clear that lim F < 1. 
dO, dO. 
Part 2: lim —'i- = lim ''s' > 0. 
dm. dW. N- 1 N+o 1 
As before, without loss of generality, take i = 1. We know that 
dO dO 
— N 1\1rN __.i. 4c.i  — L 
dW1 
dW 
Since the symmetric equilibrium allocation is independent of N, the 
second term disappears in the limit. The first term converges to 
dO1 
as desired. Finally, using Theorem 4, 
—59-. 
dC, 
= (1 - )1 SVU(TL (2+ ) > 
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 6: Fix any a. We ow that li 1 = 1, so there 
exists N such that for all N > Na — F < a. For each , let 
N(s) = N . Consider 300e sequence s ,N / ÷ as k wftn a a a 
N > N(s ) for all a. Then, for each a, I - F K a . Since k= k 
0, R + I. Further F0 is independent of N, so Râ 0 follows 
from proposition 4. 
Proposition 7: By Theorem 4, 
dO. 
= [(1 - xNl(1 - F)lv(T (2 )(i + 
From this formula, it is possible to deduce toe following three 
properties: 
dO. 
(i) 
(iU 
dO, 
decreasing in N 
(111) lim < 4 
sO i 
Property (i) IS straightforward to check. Propeerty (ii) follows from 
the fact that (1 — XN)_1(l + XN) is decreasing in N. We establish 
property (iii) as follows. 
In the proof of proposition 4, we showed that 
—60.. 
urn [(i - - ['cj[4N °-i 
aO u'(C°) + u'(c°) u(C°) 
Thus, 
hr = [ - ftuq°) [4N !iL]—1 [ v"(T°) dW. 
u'(C°) ÷ u"(c°) ut(C°) ut(C°) 
= N1[ u"(c°) ] < 
u(C ) + u'(c ) 
Now suppose that the propositionis false Then by property (ii, 
there rnust exist a sequence <akNk>kl converging to (0,) such that 
1 
> i > o 
for all k. By Proposition 3, we can without loss of generality take 
a > 0 for all k. Choose k* such that 
— a 
for some a > C. Consider a subsequence k such that N, > N for 
p K k p 
all p. Then, by property (ii), 
dWlNk*,ak 
> 
WNk,ak 
> > N ÷ a 
so 
dC1 1 him dW N, ,a N.÷ 
÷ a * 
p- 1 k 
But this contradicts property (iii). 
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Theorem 5: Each player's strategy set is the interval [O,W/21 
(he chooses a transfer belonging to this interval). Obviously, this is 
compact and convex. Further, p's utility is cor.tinuous, and concave in 
T.. As in Theorem 1, we immediately have existence. 
Next, note that if we have an equilibrium where t. = T, for 1 1 
all i without imposing this as a constraint, this configuration 
relains an equilibrium when the constraint is imposed, since the effect 
of this is only to limit deviations. Thus, the existence of a symmetric 
equilibrium when endownnts are symritric is giaranteed by Theorem 2. 
Finally, we come to uniqueness. Throughout our argument, we will 
refer to parents' first order conditions, which, for an interior 
solution, can be written as 
2u'(C.) = (u'(c) + 
Now suppose, contrary to tne theorem, that tnere are two distinct 
equilibria, (T.) and (TY1 . Then, without loss of generality, 1 i=1 1 i=1 
there exists some i for which T. > T. By P.'S budget constraint, 
C. < C.. Inspection of p. '5 first order condition (recalling that u 1 1 1 
is strictly concave) reveals that either c. < c., or 0.1 < 01+1. 
Without loss of generality, assume the latter. Then by k11's budget 
constraint, I'. < T , and T. — T. < T. — T. i+1 is1 1 1 i+i i+i 
Now we procede by induction. Suppose first that m is odd, 
T < T 
, 
arid c < c . Then, by p 'S budget constraint, i+m i+m i÷m i-s-rn i÷m 
C. > C. . By p. 's first order condition, c. > c. . By i+m i÷rn 1+nl i÷m+1 i÷÷1 
k. 's budget constraint, T. > T. , and T. — T. > i+m+i i+m+1 1+m+1 i+m+i 
—62-- 
T, I'. 
z+m i+m 
Suppose that a is even, I. < T. , and c. > c. Then, by i+m 1+m i+m i÷m 
p. 's budget constraint C. ) C. By p 'S first order condition, 14-rn j.+rn 1+::: 
> By k '5 budget constraint, T. < T. and 
i+m+-1 i÷rn+1 i+rn+1 i.+m=1 i+rn+1' 
T. -T. >T. -T. 
i÷rn+1 i+m+1 11-rn i+m 
Applying induction, we see that 
- >> . 
i÷m±1 1÷m+1 +m i+m 1 1 
for all rn. taking a = N yields a contradiction. 
Theorem 6: The formula for X + X follows directly from 
substitution into (B12a). From (B17), we have 
dC1 dT1 
= 1 — 2 
= I — 4 (1 - — X)1(1 + 
= 1 + (X + + 2)(1 — N)_1/x - Xl)(1 + 
= 1 — (1 + X)(1 + XN)(l — x)1(l — 
= 
—2X(1 + XN_1)(l - x)1(l — 
as desired. Also from (517), 
dC, dT. 
- 
-2 
dW1 
— 
dW1 
= 
- (1 - x1(x - + XN_i+1) 
_1 N —1 —1 —1 —1 N— +1 
= (x + ? + 2)(1 — ?) (x — x ) (x + x 
= 
—(1 + X)(1 - XN)1(l — )_1(_1 + XN_i+I) 
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Since the distribution of endowments is symmetric before and after a 
change in W, the equal division constraint is not binding; thus, the 
formula for dC/dW is exactly as in the proof of Proposition 4 (taking 
a = 0): 
dC 
= u"(c)[u'(C) + 
Since 0 < < 1 and since c and C are independent of N, the 
limit of (N — 1) is 0. Thus, - 
dC. dC dC 
ha = him (N — lr'N = hIm 
N+ i i N÷ 1 
From Theorem 6, this last term equals —2X(1 — X)1, which is strictiy 
positive as desired. 
1 Part 2: im R > 1 
For any Nk 
+ as k + , define Nkt k' and k as in the 
proof of Proposition 5. Note that 
a. N dC. dc. 
R 
1 
= (I! + 1=1 1 1 
dO. dc. dC. do. 
{ I]/2 + I j—'- + I/2 
lCPk 1 icKk 1 1 iKk I 
Consider some C satisfying 0 < a < —2X(1 - X)1. By the argument in 
dC 
Part 1, there exists N1 such that for all N > N1, —i > a. By an 
argument similar to that given-in Part 1, it is easy to show that 
—65— 
= = k(1 + X)(1 - X) (0 
Consider then some n satisfying 0 > > —X(1 + X)(i — X)1. There 
exists 
N2 
sucn that for all N > 
N2, . Thus, for 
N > 
do. dC, do. 
1 1 1 1 R > + / + i L + L + rran{,'1} 
— 
2k iKk i 'k 1 ijK, I 
Proceding exactly as in the proof of Proposition 5, it then follows that 
for N > 
naxN1,N2}, 
dT 
R1 k — 1)_i Nk[l — 2 Nk — (2Mk -2) - + m1n{c,} 
dTM 
From (B17), it is clear that + C as k + . Thus, 
us R 1 > 1 + min{s,n} > 1. Q.E.D. 
Proposition 10: Note that 
= 
-(i — XN)_l(k — 1)1(x + x_I + 2)( + 
First, assume that N is even. Then it is easy to check that 
dT./dW1 is positive if and only if ,j is odd. Now consider p, with 
J * 1 odd. Note that dT.1/dW1 < 0, and dT.1/dW1 < 0. Recall that 
p.'s well—being is given by 
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u(V — 2T) + (u(w + + T3_1) + u(w + + I 
This is strictly increasing in T1_1 and Tj+e Thus, p1s utility 
must declins as WI tins. We reason analogously for j even. 
Nezt,assussthat N isodd. Thsnitissasytocbsokthatif 
i—I <N—(i—I),dT1/dW1>O iff 3 isodd. Further, if 
N—(j—1)<j—I, then dT1/dW1>O itt N—i isodd. Accordingly, it I * j < N/2 thsn (j + 1) — I < N — (Ci + I) — 1], and so 
dT1_1/dW1 
and dT31/d%ç- ann.stivs itt- 1 isodd. As above; this - 
implies that P1 is wons off r ccnvsrsely it 3 is--svsn. If, en the 
otherhand,N—j+2<N/2,then N—((j—I)—1]<(j—I)—I,and 
dT3_1/dW1 and 4?1 1/dW are nsptive itt N — j is odd. Lain, this 
implies p1 is worse ottj ocnvensly it N — j is nen. Q.E.D. 
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